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Abstract

The manifestations of financial and administrative corruption and its impact on the level of performance of local councils in Jordan

Mohammad albdairat

Mu'tah University, 2014

This study aimed at identify the manifestations of financial and administrative corruption and its impact on the level of performance of local councils in Jordan. To achieve the objectives of the study, a questionnaire was developed for the purpose of data collection, the sample size was (636) respondents, (593) participants responded who represented (93.2%) of the original sample. Which was chosen in a manner simple random sample. (SPSS. V 16.1) was used in order to find the values of the averages, the standard deviations and the analysis of simple regression. The study found the following results:

1. The level of the perceptions of the respondents in the local councils in order to find administrative corruption was of a high degree. The dimension of non-compliance with regulations, instructions and work ethics was ranked first.
2. The level of the perceptions of the respondents in the local councils in order to find the financial corruption was of a high degree. The dimension of the evasion of the financial dues was ranked first.
3. The level of performance of local councils was of a high degree and the dimension of environmental aspect was in the first rank.
4. There is an impact of administrative corruption in the level of performance of local councils which explains (63.8%) of variation in the dependent variable (the level of performance of local councils).
5. There is an impact of financial corruption in the level of performance of local councils which explains (56.9%) of variation in the dependent variable (the level of performance of local councils).

The study concluded a number of recommendations that could contribute to the reduction of the manifestations of financial and administrative corruption through the modernization and development of laws and regulations as well as activating the role of regulatory agencies to get rid of this societal scourge.

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
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**Philippine Local (Alinio, 2012)
Government Officials Perceptions of Decentralization and Its Effects
" on Local Governments' Administrative Capabilities.**

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**Decentralization And Capacity ": (Utomo, 2011)
Building in Indonesian Local administration: case study of Bandung
"City Government**

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(Schneider, et.al, 2010)

The social impact of administrative corruption Do Legal " "Differences Matter
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(Germán & Freund, 2010)

Learning a board Balanced Scorecard to improve corporate " "performance

Using Balanced "

(Tohidi, 2010)

"Scorecard in Educational Organizations

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Importance of Balanced "

(Ramesh, 2010)

"Scorecard for Growth of SME Sector

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Corruption and foreign "(Eichler & Peter, 2009)
direct investment": the relationship between the host State and the
"state invested and willingness to bribe

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:"Is South Korea Succeeding (You, 2009)
"in Controlling Corruption

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(Dahlstrom& Lapuente&
"Bureaucracy, Politics and Corruption" Teorell,2009)

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**Corruption, Politics " (Heilman and Ndumbaro, 2009)
and Societal Values in Tanzania: An Evaluation of the Mkapa
"Administration's Anti-Corruption Efforts**

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**(Matei & Matei, 2009),
:"Corruption in the public organization towards a model of cost
"– benefit analysis for the anti Corruption strategies**

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Corruption: Spurring " (Lewis, 2009)
: China to Engage in International Law":

UNCAC

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Political " (Rothstein & Eek,2009)
:"Corruption and Social Trust: An Experimental Approach
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Towards a Path " (Sampson,2009)
for Harmony: The Imperative For Coordinating Nigeria's Anti-
: "Corruption Crusade

The " (Saksmeprorne, 2008)
Attitude of Political Elites Towards Political Corruption: A Case Study
: "of Thailand

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Empirical " (El- Bahnasawy, 2008)
Examination of The Determination of corruption. Cross-Section And
"Panel Analysis

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" (Vointece, 2008)
An Organization's Learning Embedded in"
Culture Influences Organizational Performance.
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(Pedersen &, Rendtorff, 2007)

Value-based Management in Local Public Organizations: A "
" Cross Cultural Management Danish Experience.

Anti-Corruption: A

(Rothstein, 2007)

: Big-Bang Theory":

Corruption and Coercion " (Osipian,2007)
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16	0.99	3.54	.8
5	0.94	3.75	.9
9	0.98	3.63	.10
3	0.94	3.82	.11
18	1.01	3.50	.12
8	0.98	3.68	.13
2	0.95	3.85	.14
4	0.95	3.77	.15
14	1.03	3.57	.16
23	1.03	3.36	.17
21	1.01	3.46	.18
11	0.98	3.61	.19
26	1.06	3.24	.20
20	1.02	3.47	.21
24	1.06	3.33	.22
15	1.00	3.56	.23
13	0.99	3.58	.24
10	0.97	3.62	.25
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2	0.95	3.71	.41
1	0.91	3.75	.42
-	0.56	3.53	42-27

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17	1.05	3.27	.48
13	1.02	3.48	.49
10	0.99	3.54	.50
2	0.94	3.76	.51
5	0.98	3.66	.52
18	1.06	3.25	.53
12	1.01	3.50	.54

4	0.98	3.69		.55
6	0.97	3.64		.56
1	0.95	3.87		.57
8	1.03	3.57		.58
16	1.03	3.34		.59
14	1.01	3.46		.60
19	1.08	3.09	()	.61
21	1.09	3.00		.62
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Variance) (VIF) (Multicollinearity)
(Tolerance) (Inflation Factor)

(10) (VIF)
(0.05) (Tolerance)
(Normal Distribution)

(Skewness)

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(1) Skewness	(10) VIF) (%5 Tolerance
0.370	2.39	0.419
0.210	2.90	0.345
0.266	3.36	0.298
0.294	3.068	0.312
0.358	1.816	0.551
0.444	2.405	0.416
0.115	2.320	0.431

(10)

(Tolerance)

(VIF)

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.(0.05)

(Normal Distribution)

(Skewness)

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(Analysis Of variance)

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F		R ²
0.000	*213.082	0.638
0.000	*161.24	0.584
0.000	*150.603	0.529
0.000	*144.735	0.499
0.000	*131.019	0.428
0.000	*91.318	0.364
0.000	*198.082	0.569
0.000	*139.603	0.521
0.000	*63.568	0.351
0.000	*86.735	0.431
0.000	*93.019	0.473
0.000	*65.318	0.362
(α ≤ 0.05)		*

(11)

(α ≤ 0.05)

(F)

) (%63.8)

() (%58.4)

() (%52.9)

() (%49.9)

() (%42.8)

() (%36.4)

(%56.9)

) (%52.1) ()

() (%35.1) (

() (%43.1)

() (%47.3)

() (%36.2)

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) ($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

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(12)

	t	Beta	B	
t				
0.000	*5.861	0.271	0.050	0.234
0.000	*8.893	0.380	0.045	0.356
0.000	*4.103	0.233	0.046	0.173
0.000	*4.527	0.206	0.047	0.169
($\alpha \leq 0.05$)				*

(12)

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(t)

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(Beta)

$(\alpha \leq 0.05)$ (t)
 (4.103 4.527 8.893 5.861) (t)
 : .(0.05 = α)
) ($\alpha \leq 0.05$)
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 Stepwise Multiple
 Regression
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 (13)
 (%47.1)
 (%56.2)
 (%60.6)
 (%63.1)

(13)

"Stepwise Multiple Regression"

t	t	R²
*		
0.000	*9.197	0.471
0.000	*6.289	0.562
0.000	*4.984	0.606
0.000	*4.524	0.631

($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

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($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

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(14)

t	t	Beta	B
0.000	*5.617	0.244	0.038
0.000	*7.120	0.288	0.033
0.000	*4.582	0.189	0.061
0.000	*4.691	0.191	0.041

($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

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(14)

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(Beta)

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(t) . ($\alpha \leq 0.05$)
 . (4.691 4.582 7.120 5.617)
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 ($\alpha \leq 0.05$)
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 Stepwise Multiple Regression
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 (15)
 (%44.1)
 (%49.2)
 (%53.3)
 . (%58.1)

(15)

"Stepwise Multiple Regression"

	t	R²
t		
0.000	*7.403	0.441
0.000	*6.279	0.492
0.000	*5.179	0.533
0.000	*4.511	0.581

($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

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($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

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(16)

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	t	Beta	B	
t				
0.000	*4.163	0.173	0.102	0.182
0.000	*10.311	0.432	0.037	0.379
0.000	*3.701	0.146	0.042	0.156
0.000	*4.072	0.172	0.045	0.18

($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

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(16)

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(t)

(Beta)

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(Beta)

(t)

(t)

.($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

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(4.072 3.701 10.311 4.163)

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($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

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Stepwise Multiple Regression

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(17)

(%39.2)

(%45.3)

(%48.2)

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(%52.6)

(17)

"Stepwise Multiple Regression"

	t	R²
*t		
0.000	10.635	0.392
0.000	4.665	0.453
0.000	4.193	0.482
0.000	3.971	0.504

($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

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($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

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(18)

	t	Beta	B	
t				
0.000	*4.169	0.226	0.048	0.198
0.000	*5.875	0.343	0.054	0.318
0.001	*3.299	0.159	0.058	0.190
0.000	*3.539	0.180	0.054	0.193

($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

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(18)

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(t)

(Beta)

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(Beta)

(t)
 (t) $\alpha \leq 0.05$
 : (3.539 3.299 5.875 4.169)
) $\alpha \leq 0.05$
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 Stepwise Multiple
 Regression
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 (19)
 (%36.1)
 (%42.5)
 (%45.4)
 . (%49.6)

(19)

"Stepwise Multiple Regression"

t	t	R ²
*		
0.000	*5.903	0.361
0.002	*3.046	0.425
0.000	*3.852	0.454
0.008	*2.666	0.472
		($\alpha \leq 0.05$)
		*

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($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

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(20)

t	t	Beta	B
0.001	*3.293	0.182	0.053
0.000	*4.484	0.231	0.046
0.002	*3.122	0.165	0.055
0.001	*3.223	0.156	0.053
		($\alpha \leq 0.05$)	*

(20)

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(t)

(Beta)

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(Beta)

(t)

(t)

$(\alpha \leq 0.05)$

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(3.223 3.122 4.484 3.293)

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$(\alpha \leq 0.05)$

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Stepwise Multiple

Regression

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(21)

(%31.4)

(%36.5)

(%39.4)

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(%42.6)

(21)

"Stepwise Multiple Regression"

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t	t	R ²
*		
0.000	*4.433	0.314
0.000	*3.658	0.365
0.000	*3.641	0.394
0.000	*3.590	0.410

($\alpha \leq 0.05$) *

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($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

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(22)

	t	Beta	B		
	t				
	0.000	*3.946	0.219	0.062	0.246
	0.000	*4.482	0.266	0.058	0.258
	0.032	*2.147	0.102	0.060	0.130
	0.002	*3.080	0.170	0.051	0.156
($\alpha \leq 0.05$)					
*					

(22)

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(t)

(Beta)

(

(Beta)

(t)

(t)

.($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

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(3.080 2.147 4.482 3.946)

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($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

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Stepwise Multiple

Regression

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(23)

(%30.6)

(%33.1)

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(%35.4)

(23)

"Stepwise Multiple Regression"

* t	t	R ²
0.000	*5.043	0.306
0.000	*4.761	0.331
0.000	*3.654	0.354

) (α≤0.05) •
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) (α≤0.05)
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(24)

t	t	Beta	B
0.000	*5.861	0.271	0.234
0.000	*8.893	0.380	0.356
0.000	*4.527	0.206	0.169

(α≤0.05) *

(24)

) (t)
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 (4.527 8.893 5.861) (t)
 : .(α≤0.05)

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Stepwise Multiple

Regression

(25)

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(%45.1)

(%54.8)

(%56.9)

(25)

"Stepwise Multiple Regression"

*t	t	R ²
0.000	*9.197	0.451
0.000	*4.984	0.548
0.000	*3.930	0.569
		($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

*

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) ($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

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(26)

t	t	Beta	B
0.000	*4.132	0.205	0.210
0.000	*8.325	0.368	0.339
0.000	*3.986	0.186	0.180
		($\alpha \leq 0.05$)	*

(26)

) (t)
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(3.986 8.325 4.132)
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.($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

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(27)

"Stepwise Multiple Regression"

*t	t	R ²
0.000	*9.159	0.432
0.000	*4.106	0.516
0.001	*3.219	0.521
		($\alpha \leq 0.05$)
		*

Stepwise Multiple

Regression

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(27)

(%43.2)

(%51.6)

(%52.1)

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) ($\alpha \leq 0.05$)
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 (28)

t	t	Beta		B
0.000	*4.691	0.259	0.059	0.279
0.000	*5.293	0.311	0.060	0.323
0.014	*2.471	0.156	0.063	0.156
(α≤0.05)				*

(28)
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 4.691) (t)
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 Regression
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 (29)
 (%29.3)
 (%33.4)

(%35.1)

(29)

"Stepwise Multiple Regression"

*t	t	R ²
0.000	*6.453	0.293
0.004	*3.478	0.334
0.012	*2.687	0.351

($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

*

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($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

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(30)

t	t	Beta	B
0.000	*4.274	0.236	0.061
0.000	*6.550	0.341	0.060
0.000	*3.852	0.209	0.056

($\alpha \leq 0.01$)

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(30)

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(t)

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(3.852 6.550 4.274)

(t)

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. ($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

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(31)

"Stepwise Multiple Regression"

*t	t	R ²
0.000	*7.229	0.346
0.000	*4.019	0.424
0.003	*3.007	0.431

(α≤0.05) *

Stepwise Multiple

Regression

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(31)

(%34.6)

(%42.4)

(%43.1)

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(α≤0.05)

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(32)

t	t	Beta		B
0.000	*3.979	0.232	0.061	0.242
0.000	*5.604	0.287	0.057	0.312
0.000	*3.695	0.247	0.059	0.218
(α≤0.05)				*

(32)

(t) (t) (t)
(3.695 5.604 3.979)
:(α≤0.05)
(α≤0.05)
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Stepwise Multiple

Regression

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(33)
(%39.2)
(%45.9)
(%47.3)

(33)

"Stepwise Multiple Regression"

*t	t	R ²
0.000	*4.573	0.392
0.000	*3.965	0.459
0.001	*3.746	0.473

($\alpha \leq 0.05$) *

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) ($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

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(34)

t	t	Beta	B
0.000	*4.762	0.268	0.063
0.000	*6.852	0.363	0.061
0.000	*3.631	0.251	0.063

($\alpha \leq 0.05$) *

(34)

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(3.631 6.852 4.762)

(t)

: .($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

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(35)

"Stepwise Multiple Regression"

*t	t	R ²
0.000	*8.267	0.263
0.000	*4.369	0.345
0.000	*3.283	0.362
(α≤0.05)		*

Stepwise Multiple

Regression

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(35)

(%26.3)

(%34.5)

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
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
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